7f8e800003
**Related issue:** N/A (security hardening) # Checklist for submitter - [x] Changes file added for user-visible changes in `changes/` - [x] Input data is properly validated, `SELECT *` is avoided, SQL injection is prevented (using placeholders for values in statements), JS inline code is prevented especially for url redirects, and untrusted data interpolated into shell scripts/commands is validated against shell metacharacters. - [x] Timeouts are implemented and retries are limited to avoid infinite loops - [x] If paths of existing endpoints are modified without backwards compatibility, checked the frontend/CLI for any necessary changes ## Summary Added network-level validation for outbound HTTP requests made by Fleet integrations (webhooks, SSO, Jira, Zendesk, certificate authorities, etc.) to prevent requests to unintended destinations. Includes a configuration option for environments that require connectivity to private network addresses. Also fixes a pre-existing nil pointer panic in Jira retry logic and ensures all HTTP clients use the validated transport. ## Testing - [x] Added/updated automated tests - [x] QA'd all new/changed functionality manually Unit and integration tests cover validation logic, boundary conditions, and multiple configuration modes. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2 lines
360 B
Plaintext
2 lines
360 B
Plaintext
- Added private network IP blocking to Fleet's HTTP client. Loopback and cloud metadata addresses (127.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16) are always blocked. RFC 1918 and other private ranges are blocked by default; use `--allow_private_network_integrations` to allow them for environments with on-prem integrations (e.g. EJBCA, Jira, SCEP servers on private networks).
|